Of a Healthy Constitution: Socialized Medicine Between the Triumphs of Social Security and Medicare by Kim, Sarah D.
Yale University
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award Library Prizes
January 2017
Of a Healthy Constitution: Socialized Medicine




Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award
Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, and the United States
History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Library Prizes at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Sarah D., "Of a Healthy Constitution: Socialized Medicine Between the Triumphs of Social Security and Medicare" (2017).



























The Senior Essay in History, Yale College 
Advisor: Jennifer Klein 



















	   2	  
 





Before Social Security……………………………………….…………………………….3  
 
THE NEW DEAL SECURITY PROJECT: EDWIN WITTE, ISIDORE FALK, AND THE 
NEED FOR INSURANCE…………………………………………………………………..……7 
The Supreme Court Speaks..................................................................................................9 
Postwar Aspirations...........................................................................................................13 
 
“SOCIALIZED MEDICINE” IN THE 1940S...............................................................................21 
Truman, Dewey, and an American Referendum................................................................23 
The Hill-Burton Act After 1946..........................................................................................26 
 
ISIDORE FALK AND THE RESEARCH OF SOCIALIZED MEDICINE.................................31 
Marjorie Shearon and a Blueprint for Discrediting Falk..................................................33 
The Wagner Bills................................................................................................................37 
 
FRANZ GOLDMANN, LABOR, AND SUSPICION..................................................................43 
 

















“The phrase ‘socialized medicine’ means little or much. It has many different implications for 
those who use it and to those who hear it. It would be only by chance that I could guess what it 
means to you.” 
-Isidore Falk to the National Medical Association, New York, 1939 
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Introduction  
 
 In January 1937, Thomas Thacher, a former solicitor general of the United States under 
President Hoover, gave a talk at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Medicine. He 
attacked socialized medicine as a “fallacy” that would “blanket the country without regard to 
local conditions and individuals.” He also expressed doubts about the constitutionality of 
socialized medicine under the proposed system of compulsory health insurance, adding that 
states had no power to enforce funding for it. (Funding for such insurance would entail a sliding 
scale of costs between those in the upper and middle-income brackets, or to take money from the 
rich and give it to the poor.) Speaking directly to the physicians present, he said, “Generosity in 
relieving distress is characteristic of our people, and particularly of your profession. But we 
prefer to do our own giving.”1 
 Speeches of this sort were not rare in the 1930s or in the following years. The key players in 
the debate surrounding national health insurance all make an appearance – physicians and 
government officials discussed the implication of what a compulsory system would mean in 
America. Physicians were of the opinion that charity should not be linked to a compulsory 
infrastructure – but they found their strongest allies in those who made constitutional arguments 
against the idea. Thus the narrative of socialized medicine as distinctly un-American came to 
dominate the national conversation. 
 
Before Social Security  
 The elusive prospect of universal health insurance has perplexed and challenged American 
reformers ever since the concept first entered the American political discourse. Yet the idea of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Socialization of Medicine Hit as Fallacy,” Springfield Republican, January 9, 1937, America’s Historical 
Newspapers. 
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government being partly responsible for the health of its citizens was hardly new. As early as the 
yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia in the 1790s, the question of whether quarantine was a 
federal or a state responsibility confronted Congress. The blueprint of the new republic, the 
Constitution, “made no mention of health”2 and left the interpretation of the Declaration of 
Independence’s inalienable rights of “life” for later generations to link to the right to health or 
healthcare.3 
 As medicine changed, so did the question of the provision of healthcare within an 
interpretation of the Constitution that was both politically palatable and feasible. Various policies 
in the 18th and 19th centuries marked the federal government’s foray into the administration of 
healthcare; the 1798 “Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen” or the Civil War 
merchant marine federal hospitals are but two of these examples.4 In the twentieth century, 
however, the prevalence of Americans visiting hospitals increased dramatically, medical 
treatment became more efficacious, and paying physicians for their services grew to a scale large 
enough for questions about a patient’s right to care, or a physician’s to reimbursement, emerged 
as ones of political economy.5 With the Great Depression of the 1930s, the issue of health 
became inextricably linked to a question of security. Economic security meant health security 
and vice versa; after all, illness or injury meant lost wages from an inability to work in tandem 
with unpredictable expenses for treatment itself. Within the conceptual paradigm of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Beatrix Hoffman, Healthcare for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States since 1930 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), xxv.  
3 According to the historian Beatrix Hoffmann, “there is no evidence that Thomas Jefferson, in an age when 
medicine was not equated with lifesaving powers, had such an idea in mind.” 
4 Hoffman, Healthcare for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States since 1930, xxvi. 
5 It is interesting to note that physicians seemed to have no problem with the idea of calling upon the federal 
government to intervene to secure their right to reimbursement for their services. They preferred to give charity care 
as they saw fit, but also expected federal participation in this charity – after all, they had to also make a livelihood. 
Professionals insisted that the government had a role in providing indigent care by retroactively reimbursing 
physicians after the latter had provided care. This growing call for government action arose out of the Depression 
era, when providers became frustrated with the number of patients they had to turn away, and the very little 
reimbursement they received for patients they did treat. See Beatrix Hoffmann’s Healthcare for Some: Rights and 
Rationing in the United States since 1930, 15.  
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insurance, prevalent in Europe and the U.S. at the time, the notion of a right to health was 
translated into protection against risk, which paved the way for the success of the Economic 
Security Act of 1935, otherwise known as the Social Security Act.  
 Yet the Act itself did not include a health insurance component.6 Consequently, debate 
continued over the next three decades, culminating with the passage of Medicare and Medicaid. 
While monumental achievements for elderly and poor Americans, this legislation fell short of the 
broader of ambitions of proponents of universal health insurance. With the passage of Social 
Security, its architects certainly intended to continue expanding both the demographic reach of 
its coverage as well as the types of social welfare benefits provided. Excluded groups did win 
inclusion gradually after World War II, but the broader agenda stalled in the 1940s and early 50s, 
despite the overall institutionalization of the New Deal. Until President Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society and War on Poverty, defining access to medical care and health insurance as a right was 
a volatile discussion that required examining the role of Congress in upholding “the general 
welfare” (an ambiguous Constitutional mandate) and the role of the president in pursuing an 
agenda for national health insurance while avoiding the censure of the powerful American 
Medical Association, which had established a strong hold on the American ideals of the 
physician’s roles, medical ethics, and access to health. The ability to manipulate the label of 
“socialized medicine” and its valences significantly shaped the discourse around the 
constitutionality of a health insurance agenda, and whether or not such an agenda would have a 
detrimental effect on a distinctly “American” way of life or set of ideals.  
There has been extensive scholarship on the question of national, public health insurance 
in the United States. Historians have looked at factors such as the absence of a labor party and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Beatrix Hoffman, Healthcare for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States since 1930 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). Koppelman writes that Franklin Roosevelt considered health insurance along 
with other New Deal reforms, but feared it would “sink” Social Security and unemployment insurance.  
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the emergence of collective bargaining over private health insurance benefits from employers. 
Others have argued that the Red Scare of the late 1940s and early 1950s fundamentally derailed 
the possibility of a broader welfare state. Historians who write about race assert that racial 
politics in the South were divisive enough to prevent any sort of implementation on a federal 
level.7 There is also an extensive social science literature. Political scientists have argued that 
structurally American federalism stymies the potential of a social democratic welfare state; that 
Americans are ideologically anti-statist; or that the U.S. traditionally has a weak central state.8   
But invoking the Constitution’s allowance or disavowal of national health reform has not 
been at the forefront of the discussion – this, despite the idea that the constitutionality argument 
might have been the strongest at the disposal of ‘socialized medicine’s’ opponents, since loyalty 
to the Constitution is a bipartisan given. Stoking paranoia against a social system that threatened 
the fabric of American democracy turned out to be easier than legally attacking the premises 
upon which reformers built congressional proposals for socialized medicine. The latter tactic led 
to a politics of fear that, in a departure from the economic arguments that helped shape Social 
Security, perfectly set the stage for McCarthyism.  Opponents of socialized medicine presented 
political and ideological arguments instead of constitutional or legal arguments against proposed 
reform. In doing so, they conflated Americanism with constitutionalism, thereby making 
opposition to socialized medicine patriotic. Americanism did not necessarily hold the same 
meaning for conservative politicians and physicians, but they united where they found common 
ground in order to oppose an importation of ‘un-American’ ideals from abroad. Meanwhile, 
proponents of national health insurance immediately after World War II were faced with the task 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Jill Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health Insurance (Oxford University 
Press, 2006). Hospitals were racially segregated for patients, and even integrated staff had distinct roles for black 
and white physicians and nurses. Southern politicians opposed federal “intrusion” into local health policies and 
demanded that administration of social programs be left to the states and local governments.   
8 Ibid. 
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of defending their own patriotism while finding ways to advocate reform that built on the Social 
Security success of the New Deal era.   
 By examining the contributions of some of the architects of Social Security and the efforts 
for national health reform in the late 1930s and 1940s, this study explores the intersection of 
intellectual, policy, and legal history. Edwin Witte, Isidore Falk, and Franz Goldmann were some 
of these scholars and researchers who advocated some form of national health insurance; each of 
them found their efforts stymied by ad hominem arguments and suspicion (courtesy of 
conservative Congressmen and their associates, such as James Kem and Marjorie Shearon). The 
reluctance of these health insurance advocates to associate with the label of “socialized 
medicine,” as well as their opponents’ enthusiasm to make that connection, illustrates the 
political balancing act that advocates thought they could strike and control. Their objective to 
design a federal health insurance program to socially distribute risk required assessing the 
drawbacks of the alternative: private insurance, based on medical underwriting and cash 
indemnity, which the medical profession backed by the 1950s. The role of the courts in 
interpreting the Constitution for health and healthcare, and the role of the American Medical 
Association in doing the same, became crucial elements in this contestation.  
 
The New Deal Security Project: Edwin Witte, Isidore Falk, and the Need for Insurance 
 
 
In his January 1935 address to Congress on Social Security, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
recommended different types of legislation to bolster economic security. One of them was 
“additional federal aid to State and local public health agencies and the strengthening of the 
Federal Public Health service.”9 He took note to distinguish that he was not “at this time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Franking D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on Social Security, January 17, 1935,” in   
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recommending the adoption of so-called ‘health insurance,’ though groups representing the 
medical profession are cooperating with the Federal Government in the further study of the 
subject and definite progress is being made.”10  While cautious, President Roosevelt’s 
announcement signaled that he supported increasing federal funds to the states in order to 
strengthen the infrastructure of healthcare. His insistence that the Committee on Economic 
Security was consulting with physicians suggests that the medical profession was perhaps not 
incontrovertibly against universal health insurance.  
In 1934, Isidore Falk, a member of the Committee on Economic Security (CES) appointed by 
FDR, identified the populations affected11 by his research. He also identified the need for large 
groups to avoid adverse selection and the inconsistency between public complaints about 
medical costs (that they are high) and the “real” problem of medical costs (that they are variable 
and uncertain).12 Adverse selection, an infamous sort of market failure in insurance markets, was 
serious enough to hinder otherwise well-designed programs for health insurance – it was also 
serious enough to, in Falk’s view, call for the construction “state wide compulsory programs”13 
that could draw from sophisticated means of drawing revenue, such as a sliding scale for taxing 
different income groups and contributions from industry. 
Falk and Edwin Witte, an economist who led the CES, viewed social risk pooling as an 
important mechanism that would provide the basis for a successful national welfare blueprint. 
Unlike unemployment insurance or old age insurance, however, health insurance was something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic 
Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act, 50th Anniversary Edition (The National 
Conference on Social Welfare, 1985). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Isidore Falk, “Outline of a Talk before the Committee on Medical Economics (Stamford Medical Society)” 
February 27, 1934, Box 161, Folder 2339, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, Isidore Falk Papers. These 
populations were the indigent, the semi- or “medical” indigent (those who were too poor to pay for healthcare, but 
did not qualify for insurance), and the lower wage and salary classes. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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that all members of society could consume throughout their lifetimes. Market failures like 
adverse selection could be alleviated by effective pooling of many people in an insurance scheme 
in order to drive down the average cost of each beneficiary. Instead of having a few costly 
beneficiaries (the ones who most need health insurance), under a pooling mechanism, risk could 
be diluted – regardless of the economic climate.  
As New Dealers embarked on the process of creating a national social welfare structure, its 
unprecedented nature compelled them to consider constitutional questions. What indeed would 
be the constitutional underpinning for social insurance? During the meetings of the Committee 
on Economic Security (CES) and the congressional hearings on the bill, New Dealers, as 
“advocates of social security played on the murky distinction between insurance and welfare, 
were less concerned about the confusion they were arousing between private insurance and 
social insurance than they were about the constitutional tests that the Social Security Act 
faced.”14 New Dealers capitalized on the federal government’s right to use its taxing and 
spending powers to underwrite a compulsory national “insurance” program.”15 But the U.S. 
Supreme Court had begun in 1935 to strike down key pieces of New Deal legislation. Thus, even 
as they got the program underway, the fate of social security remained legally uncertain for the 
next two years.  
 
The Supreme Court Speaks 
 After 1937, the Supreme Court transformed from an entity that blocked some key New Deal 
policies to one that backed liberalism for decades. According to political scientist Andrew 
Koppelman, the Court had originally resisted Roosevelt’s unprecedented push towards national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 W. Andrew Achenbaum, Social Security: Visions and Revisions (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 28. 
15 Ibid. 
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legislation in the time of crisis. However, it eventually “capitulated”16 and after Roosevelt 
appointed a majority of the justices, the Court did not attempt to place limits on congressional 
and executive power for the next half-century. Federalism persisted, but the Supreme Court was 
in a position to back liberalism for decades. Two Supreme Court cases eventually dealt with the 
constitutionality of the Social Security Act, working with the clause of the Constitution that 
granted Congress the power “to spend money in aid of the ‘general welfare.’”17 This general 
welfare clause, which appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, gives Congress the 
power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common defense and general Welfare of the United States." In 1937, Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis upheld Title IX of the act, which imposed an excise tax upon employers of at least eight 
people.18 In Helvering v. Davis (1937), a shareholder of the Edison Electric Illuminating 
Company brought the case to court to restrain his company from making payments he viewed as 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court “was asked to determine (1) whether the tax imposed upon 
employers by section 804 of the Social Security Act is within the power of Congress under the 
Constitution, and (2) whether the validity of the tax imposed upon employees by Section 801 of 
the SSA is properly in issue in this case, and if it is, whether that tax is within the power of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the Assault on Health Care Reform, 3. This capitulation 
came after FDR’s 1937 Judicial Procedures Reform Bill, a failed venture to “pack the court” with justices that would 
find his New Deal proposals constitutional. Since the Constitution does not define how many justices should be on 
the Supreme Court, Roosevelt pointed out that Congress could change it as it saw fit. This was at a time when legal 
scholarship was engaging in the debate over the Constitution as a “living document” (Supreme Court justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., first referred to the ‘Living Constitution’ in State of Missouri v. Holland, United States Game 
Warden (1920), saying “case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in 
that of what was said a hundred years ago” (See State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416.) 
17 Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic 
Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act, 128.  
18 Steward Machine Company, Petitioner v. Harwell G. Davis, Individually and as Collector of Internal Revenue, 
301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
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Congress under the Constitution.”19 The Court ruled that Social Security was an appropriate 
measure by Congress to provide for the general welfare that did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment, noting that “Congress did not improvise a judgment when it found that the award of 
old age benefits would be conducive to the general welfare;”20 rather, the CES had already done 
the research to arrive at this conclusion.  The Supreme Court looked to federal research and the 
lessons of the Depression to validate the need for social insurance.  
  Falk wrote to Edwin Witte, the executive director of the Committee on Economic 
Security under FDR, that the president was directly reviewing a draft of its recommendations and 
the final report would depend on his reactions to the details of the program. The architects of the 
program realized that like legislation developed along state lines, “compensation funds cannot 
remain solvent in such a severe depression…without governmental aid”21 Using ‘governmental 
aid’ in lieu of ‘governmental intervention’ illustrated a psychological hesitation to be interpreted 
as proponents of the latter, even as federal researchers in a time of intense national need. 
  Again, this nuance suggests that the legal basis for social insurance was at least partly 
informed by the need for it in a time of economic distress. FDR called “the security of social 
insurance… a minimum of the promise that we can offer to the American people. They constitute 
a right which belongs to every individual and every family willing to work…[and] are the 
essential fulfillment of measures already taken toward relief, recovery and reconstruction.”22 The 
right to recovery from devastating (national) financial loss was a universal one, and the intensity 
of feeling with which this sentiment resonated with the American people as they moved from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic 
Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act, 128. Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).  
20 Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic 
Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act. 
21 Isidore Falk, “Re: Committee Report,” January 4, 1935, 42 Folder 331, Isidore Falk Papers.  
22 Statements by President Roosevelt, 139, Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, The Report of the Committee on 
Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act.  
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Depression Era into World War II is difficult to overstate.23  The right to recovery encompassed 
the right to insurance from risk, as “the essence of insurance is the distribution of risk.”24 In his 
public writing, correspondence, and speeches, Isidore Falk stressed the need for “public action”25 
in order to achieve this wide distribution of risk, even in times of economic recovery – or at any 
point during the macroeconomic concept of a business cycle. In 1943, he identified the 
importance of harnessing the wartime boost in economic productivity in order to solidify social 
security. He named full employment and social insurance as the pillars of security in a post-war 
society regardless of its economic state, saying, “the essence of social insurance is wide 
distribution of risk through public action, so that those who are or may at any time find 
themselves on the lowest rungs of the economic ladder, those who need protection most, can be 
assured at least basic security.”26 Falk was not necessarily appealing to a charitable American 
nature, but looking ahead to sustaining security as the economy transitioned from a wartime one 
to a peacetime one.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making 
of a Vast Industry (Basic Books, 1983), 278. Public opinion in 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1942 overwhelmingly agreed 
that government ought to help people pay for the medical care that they need. Starting in 1943, according to Starr, 
polls also asked “whether people thought it was ‘a good idea’ if Social Security also paid for doctors’ and hospital 
care that Americans might need in the future.” The answer, again, was yes: 58% in 1943, then 68% in 1944 and 
1945 felt that Social Security could be a suitable and reasonable source of funding for health care. However, 
compared to these numbers, support fell when the idea to raise Social Security taxes in order to pay for health 
insurance was put forth.  
24 Isidore Falk, “Social Insurance and the Abolition of Want (League for Industrial Democracy, New York),” May 8, 
1943, Isadore Falk Papers, MS 1039, Box 161 Folder 2367, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, 
CT. (Hereafter Falk Papers). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. Falk named two challenges for the postwar era: “The first challenge to all who look ahead to the 
post-war period is to devise means of perpetuating wartime levels of national income and of ensuring that 
full employment of manpower and resources which is prerequisite to a large national income. The second 
challenge is to assure the adequacy of social insurance to abolish or, at least, to minimize want. Together, 
full employment and social insurance are the guarantees of social security.”  
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  A wide distribution of risk would result in replacing the financial risk of sickness for an 
individual with a lowered average cost of risk for members of a larger group.28 This reliance on 
the statistical law of large numbers (here, the reduction of the average cost with a larger pool of 
individuals who band together) would help alleviate the otherwise devastating effects of two 
main costs to a person who falls ill or sustains an injury: “loss of earnings of wage earners on 
account of disabling sickness, and the costs of medical care.”29 Put another way, Falk argued, 
“volume and variety of care is predictable for the group, but not for the individual. The principle 
problem[s] [are] uncertain, variable and budgetable costs and uncertain support for practitioners 
and institutions.”30  This is especially important considering the fact that, along with medical 
technology in the postwar era, costs for care also rose.  
 
Postwar Aspirations 
 As an advocate and architect of social insurance, Falk may have considered the economic 
expansion during World War II a boon and an unprecedented opportunity. Departing from the 
economic crisis argument, he suggested instead that the economic boom of the war now offered 
the ideal time to proceed with a permanent system of economic security through expanded social 
insurance. In late 1943, Falk contended that “a period of full employment like the present is the 
most favorable time for initiating a contributory social insurance program [because] the initial 
impact of the contributions can be more easily borne by works and employers than at any other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Isidore Falk, “Economic Security Against Sickness (Address given before the Social Problems Forum, Johns 
Hopkins University),” May 15, 1936, Box 161 Folder 2344, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, Isidore Falk 
Papers. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Isidore Falk, “Costs of Medical Care” May 7, 1934, Box 161 Folder 2341, Yale University Manuscripts and 
Archives Isidore Falk Papers. 
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time.”31 Whereas a decade before the uncertainty of depression emboldened proponents of the 
right to security, by 1943 increased employment and employer contributions to tax revenue made 
a contributory program seem plausible. 
 Policymakers and researchers considered various types of public insurance: old-age 
insurance, sickness insurance, and health insurance besides the private market. In 1936, Falk had 
noted that though the 1935 adoption of the Social Security Act gave the United States a federal 
System of old-age insurance, and a federal-state system of unemployment compensation, “we do 
not have any large-scale compulsory health or sickness insurance…or any public medical 
provisions of equivalent magnitude except in the services for the care of the legally and 
medically indigent.”32 There was little progress made in health insurance, compulsory or 
otherwise, in the immediate years following this statement. Edwin Witte admonished the lack of 
progress made to establish national health insurance by 1948: “health insurance is the oldest 
form of social insurance… it has been discussed for 30 years, but so far not a single state has 
enacted a compulsory health insurance law.”33 The debate surrounding why comprehensive 
health insurance reform had not taken place was as complicated as the factors that went into 
making such policies.   
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 Although architects of Social Security like Witte envisioned it to be a “only the beginning… 
[of an] extension to other fields [such as] health insurance,”34 charges that a compulsory health 
insurance program would lead, in incremental steps, towards “socialized medicine”  did  
surround their work. It is worth examining this term, and its implications, with some detail, even 
before Cold War-era paranoia exacerbated the debate surrounding it. Isidore Falk made clear that 
the phrase “socialized medicine,” a rallying cry in later years for pro-American Medical 
Association groups in their crusade against compulsory health insurance, did not carry as much 
weight in the late 1930s. Its many different “implications”35 led to inaccurate accusations against 
proponents of a state-wide or nation-wide compulsory program, which Falk emphasized was key 
for success for addressing one of the essential needs of the time.36 As early as 1934, doctors had 
indignantly opposed the idea of government dictating their practice, prompting a defense from 
Falk: “Regarding my attitude on health insurance, I never concerned myself much with this 
subject until the barrage of letters and telegrams from state and county medical societies reached 
Washington…in which our committee was unfairly charged with trying to force a health 
insurance measure upon the country without consulting the [medical] profession.”37 In fact, Falk 
explains, the rejection of his expertise by the medical community induced his advocacy of a 
greater representation of federal research and involvement in healthcare: “If since then, I 
personally and our committee, has given more attention to this subject it has been largely 
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35 Isidore Falk, “‘The Pro and Con of Socialized Medicine as It Would Affect the Negro People and the Negro 
Professional Group,’ National Medical Association Annual Meeting, New York: Text of Introductory Remarks,” 
August 17, 1939, Box 161 Folder 2355, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, Isidore Sydney Falk Papers. 
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Folder 2340, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives Isidore Falk Papers. 
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because we have been forced to do so by the misrepresentation of our attitude.”38 His opposition 
only had its own zeal and mischaracterization of him to thank for his progress.  
What Falk called a chronic “misrepresentation in the United States about insurance 
against medical costs”39 in 1934 cast future attempts to develop national health insurance policy 
as gross overreaches of government. The relationship between doctors and policymakers, and 
between the states and the federal government, struggled to find an equilibrium that could find 
support from all parties. Falk insisted that the design of such programs were not only for “the 
welfare of the public and of the individual person…[but also] for the proper support of the 
professions and our medical institutions,”40 echoing the sentiment of FDR and his 
encouragement of the rising prestige of medicine. In one of several defenses of proposed 
programs of compulsory health insurance at the state level, Falk wrote, “This is not a program of 
state medicine or public medicine or socialization of medicine. Nor is it anything else a clever 
person might call it to confuse this issue. Our proposal is merely for a system which would make 
it possible for people to budget the costs of medical care and receive the services which they 
need.”41 He then repeated the principle of reducing average risk of loss through aggregating 
individual risk, and emphasized the unpredictability of healthcare expenses to do so. He pointed 
out, for example, that individual expenses can differ greatly from the average: “[On average] we 
spend about $30 a person [a year] for health and medical care; but as individuals or families we 
spend from nothing to as much as we earn in a year or more.”42 The economic difference 
between individual costs and average costs are a critical factor, but average costs cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Isidore Falk, “Letter to Dr. Olin West,” December 21, 1934, Box 42 Folder 231, Yale University Manuscripts and 
Archives Isidore Falk Papers. 
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40 Isidore Falk, “Opportunities for Voluntary Insurance (Speech at the Suburban Club).” 
41 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
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achieved as an expected expense organically: “If each of us had to spend only the average costs 
for our income class, we should not be worried by medical costs and we should be able to have 
all the medical care which we really need,”43 or even afford more medical service. Simple 
economics could realize what seemed infeasible.  
The only way to combat high expenditures was to construct a public insurance system, Falk 
wrote; other benefits of an insurance system include better quality of care and the opportunity to 
plan and budget for expenses based on a budgetary constraint with less uncertainty. Falk argued 
that beneficiaries of a health insurance program could actively invest in their health with the help 
of the insurer, without setting up a profit guarantee for the provider. In fact, the system seems to 
be one of minimal profit for the insurance provider, as “a nonprofit scheme whereby people 
could budget their costs and pay them into a non-profit, non-commercial fund, [and] from this 
general fund the hospital, the doctor, the nurse or other agency could be remunerated for the 
services which they may furnish to the insured persons.”44 Since Falk believed the government 
could be more capable of playing this nonprofit role than multiple private insurers, he envisioned 
the federal government as the provider. Furthermore, a nonprofit entity would be more palatable 
to the public than a for-profit one.  
Characterizing health insurance as a fund for predictable reimbursements based on usage 
would have also appealed to labor groups and organizations. Looking beyond the end of the war, 
Witte confirmed the relative popularity of health insurance among certain groups in 1943 in 
Postwar Economic Problems, and in doing so, pointed out the link between a foundation of 
private insurance and the potential for public insurance to build on top of private insurance’s 
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ubiquity, all in spite of organized medicine’s opposition. He wrote that despite progress in 
voluntary medical and hospital insurance, compulsory health insurance “seems remote”- and yet, 
in actuality, “actual socialized medicine” was gaining traction:  
While organized labor, farmers’ organizations, and women’s clubs [endorse] 
[compulsory health insurance]… organized medicine fights it relentlessly as ‘socialized 
medicine.’ In the meantime, actual socialized medicine – medical care at public expense 
– has increased at a rapid pace…During the Depression and still more in wartime, the 
public part of this mixed system [of public and private care] has become increasingly 
important. It is probable that this trend will continue.45 
 
This hybridized system of medical care should be neither threatening nor unfamiliar, he argued. 
Expanding an existing public role should not be cause for controversy. Witte simultaneously 
defined the nebulous phrase “socialized medicine” as an ideological and political charge, while 
also seeking to distinguish it from services already provided by the government. Importantly, he 
also notes that compulsory health insurance is not the same thing as socialized medicine, despite 
organized medicine’s protest: the former “seems remote” and far away in the future, while the 
latter “has increased at a rapid pace” – that is, it already exists. Even though “[social security] 
[was] a new term that still lacks precise definition…, used only in the United States and in this 
country…unheard of before 1935,”46 New Deal health reformers wanted to innovate 
“mechanisms that would help pay for individually dispensed medical care.”47 The international 
surge towards similar programs proved that the intersection of private and public was, in fact, 
more necessary than ever.  
Yet the American approach to social insurance differed from that of most other countries, 
even in realms that only overlapped with health insurance. Regarding the need for social 
insurance to provide income to replace lost wages in cases of “(one) illness and (two) permanent 
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disability,” Witte wrote that in most countries the former is provided through compulsory health 
insurance, the latter in connection with old-age insurance. In this country, however, “because 
compulsory health insurance has met with such violent opposition from the doctors, the Social 
Security Board has proposed that compensation for both temporary and permanent disability be 
administered along with old-age and survivors’ insurance.”48 Though it was “hoped that such a 
program would be acceptable to the doctors,”49 in a bitterly disappointing turn for Witte,  
“organized medicine…seems fearful that anything of this sort will serve as an entering wedge for 
compulsory health insurance.50 His writing does not denote surprise, but nonetheless exposes a 
disappointment with the medical profession for refusing to experiment with anything that might 
become an increment towards compulsory health insurance.  
By linking compensation for illness (temporary disability) and permanent disability to old-
age and survivors’ insurance, which had already passed a constitutional test, the Social Security 
Board was constructing a compromise in which Social Security takes on a significant portion of 
what health insurance would normally cover separately. Perhaps some of the opposition from the 
medical profession stemmed from the fact that the Social Security Board was still an arm of the 
federal government, and both the medical profession and the insurance industry were regulated, 
minimally, at the state level. With AMA refusal to accept a more conservative version of an 
insurance infrastructure many other countries had already adopted, Witte desperately tried to 
convince policymakers that social security “consistent with an economy of free enterprise differs 
from social security in a planned economy.”51 Social security, he contended, “appropriate to our 
old Federal system of governance in which there were sharp lines of distinction between 
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the…national and state governments is different from that which suits a…unitary government,”52 
towards which Witte saw the United States moving. The medical profession, federal boards and 
its members, and the economy would dictate the genesis of a distinctly American welfare state 
with respect to health insurance, rooted not in the Bill of Rights but in the inter-state commerce 
clause and the Congressional power to tax and spend.  
The idea of the “welfare state” came about in the postwar era, during which Witte strongly 
pushed back against the usage of what he called “alarmist” terms to describe the welfare state. 
He believed these alarmists’ objective was to “oppose pending legislative measures”53 that 
would improve the health security of Americans. In 1948, he made clear: “I believe in the 
‘welfare state,’ but only in the meaning in which ‘welfare’ is used in the Constitution of the 
United States and in which our American government has always been a welfare state.”54 Thus, 
even after World War II, the “general welfare clause” continued to be invoked by liberals, and 
became ever more important after the death of FDR and the 1946 Republican resumption of 
control of Congress for the first time since 1932.55 Yet, with the intensifying Cold War and 
coalescence of Federal Loyalty investigations, political conservatives and Republicans 
questioned his commitment to Americanism itself; in response, he made clear that he “look[s] 
upon the Constitution as the finest political instrument ever conceived by man,”56 emphasizing 
its “remarkable adaptability…to changing conditions.”57  Witte and his colleagues believed that 
the Constitution mandated, and granted, the responsibility to pursue the fulfillment of the four 
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freedoms FDR had outlined in his 1941 State of the Union Address.58 Since the Constitution was 
the blueprint for American freedom and law, it was important to Witte that he be viewed as a 
contributor to expanding the benefits the document had to offer, if not to constitutional theory 
itself. Liberal ideas of the adaptability of the Constitution and the reach of the federal 
government in compensating health and medical care were ideals that moved Falk and Witte to 
pursue programs that would only partly come to fruition in the following decades.  
 
“Socialized Medicine” in the 1940s  
 
The phrase “socialized medicine” has had an illustrious career in American political 
discourse. In the Progressive Era, members of the American Medical Association (AMA) were 
sympathetic to public health reforms and “believed compulsory health insurance would 
inevitably come to the United States, as it had to Europe.”59 It is important to note that in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, the AMA’s Journal and Committee on Social Insurance agreed 
that physicians’ “opposition [or] repudiation…of [compulsory health insurance] is less than 
useless;”60 indeed, their editorial solidly backed national health insurance, saying “no other 
social movement in modern economic development is so pregnant with benefit to the public.”61 
Such opinions, however, quickly soured.  
The usage of “socialized medicine” in debate in both houses of Congress in the mid-to-
late 1940s impacted the national conversation that would affect its connotation and legislative 
future. Just after the end of World War II, the House of Representatives convened hearings to 
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consider proposals and professional opinions on national health insurance in November of 1945. 
Representative Homer A. Ramey (R-Ohio) spoke about the health care system in New Zealand 
and Russia; he had “had the pleasure of visiting socialized medicine hospitals in Russia and the 
observations of the activities there constrains [him] to emphatically say [he] hopes it never 
happens here”63 in the United States. Statements such as these linked socialized medicine to the 
Soviet Union on the eve of the Cold War, without explicitly criticizing the country or its 
healthcare system. Indeed, Ramey takes care to note otherwise.  
Representative Ramey went on to cite New Zealand’s allegedly less-than-ideal 
experience with socialized medicine as a reason for the American resistance to implementing its 
own “nationwide government medical system.”65 He quoted a doctor on this subject:  
No person of intelligence will oppose constructive social legislation, and least of all the 
medical profession whose chief concern is human welfare. It is extremely difficult, 
however, to determine where constructive measures end and destructive paternalism 
begins, especially when administered by an impersonal and an entrenched bureaucracy. 
Our problem is the provision of medical care of high quality to the Nation without 
sacrifice of liberty. Sacrifice of small liberties leads to sacrifice of greater liberties and 
eventual loss of all. It is not likely that the working people and the employers of this 
Nation are ready to commit to a compulsory taxation to support a medical care plan 
administered by a Federal bureaucracy.66 
 
This statement is as notable for what it leaves out as it is for what it includes. The physician 
quoted above emphasized the American medical profession as open to social legislation it deems 
constructive, without describing or defining the parameters of such legislation. He represents 
social security and the welfare state not as citizenship entitlements but as destructive 
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“paternalism” that will lead inevitably down a “slippery slope” to state authoritarian control; 
indeed, this language echoes that of prominent conservatives such as Friedrich Hayek and 
Ludwig von Mises. He considers physicians the safeguards of liberty – a dear American tradition 
– without specifying which liberties. While emphasizing quality of care as a priority for 
physicians, he did not mention access to care as another priority. He also appeared to be 
convinced that American physicians embodied the opposite of impersonal care and paternalism.  
The phobia of a federal bureaucracy is a complete reversal from the AMA’s position a 
few decades prior. (Jonathan Oberlander points to 1920 as the approximate time at which its 
political position shifted. In 1920, conservative members of the AMA voiced opposition to the 
idea of national leadership, along with concerns that “compulsory health insurance would 
threaten the growing incomes and social status American physicians were achieving”67 in the age 
of growing scientific prestige.) Interestingly, the concern this unnamed doctor voices about the 
loss of liberties does not specify whose liberties are at stake – they could very well be those of 
the physician, and his liberty to receive compensation for his care at a level that he finds 
acceptable.  
 
Truman, Dewey, and an American Referendum  
The scope of the debate extended beyond the medical profession, much to the delight of 
its members. If the 1936 presidential election had brought the constitutionality of FDR’s 
initiatives to the forefront, lawmakers in 1948 treated national health insurance as an election 
topic, a potential referendum from the American people. On August 3, 1948, Senator James P. 
Kem (R-Missouri) spoke about the candidates that election year, incumbent President Truman 
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and his challenger, Republican Thomas Dewey, and their stances on the question of socialized 
medicine: 
Mr. Truman believes as an ‘ultimate aim’ there must be a compulsory comprehensive 
insurance system to apply to all our people. Governor Dewey believes that ‘compulsory 
socialized medicine is no good’... I believe that the position of the Republican candidate, 
Governor Dewey, is sound, and backed up by theory and experience. I believe the ideas 
of the Democratic candidate, President Truman, are a distinct threat to the medical and 
allied professions as we now know them and to the American way of life.68  
 
Kem did not elaborate the ‘theory and experience’ that backed Governor Dewey’s ideas.  
Instead, he cites the model of “two ways of life competing for supremacy in the world today”69 – 
one is that of the Russians, “based on the Marxian principles of the abolition of private enterprise 
as the means of production,”70 while the other is the American system, which is “based on the 
principles of free enterprise and personal initiative.”71 The American aversion to a Marxist 
influence in health, an intimate facet of Americans’ lives, is evident here, as is the attempt to 
categorize two large nations’ health systems into binary terms.  
Senator Kem insisted that American institutions and professional organization of medical 
care are “sound,”72 and that any shortcomings can “be corrected within the framework of our 
time-tried, time-tested system of nonpolitical medicine.”73 His characterization of American 
medicine as nonpolitical is curious after a world war that amplified the scale of public health 
efforts, including a vast public maternity care system for wives of servicemen and an expanded 
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appointed Thomas Thacher (from the Introduction of this paper) to the New York State Court of Appeals in 1943. 
Both of Governor Dewey’s presidential bids in the 1940s came very close to succeeding. Dewey had already run 
against FDR as the Republican nominee for the presidency in 1944, but he lost to FDR in the closest of the latter’s 
reelection campaigns. The 1948 presidential election would turn out to be one of the greatest upsets in U.S. history, 
since predictions nearly universally agreed he would defeat Truman. Famously, the Chicago Daily Tribune ran 
thousands of copies of papers with the headline “DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN” before the final tallies came in.  
69  Statement by U.S. Senator James P. Kem, August 3rd, 1948, U.S. Senate, “Congressional Record - Senate, 80th 
Congress, Session 2. August 3rd, 1948” (1948).  
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veterans health care system. In addition, a year after the war, the passage of the Hospital Survey 
and Construction Act (the Hill-Burton Act) in 1946 with the arrival of the new Republican-led 
Congress74 explicitly linked federal financial support to locally controlled hospitals, and the 
influence of the American Medical Association in politics grew tremendously.  
During his single term in the Senate, Kem made opposition to Truman his top priority. 
He listed some of President Truman’s public statements on universal health insurance as 
evidence of the threat that he posed, and implied that Truman was attempting to ease in his 
proposals as mainstream ideas. According to Kem, despite the fact that Truman in November 
1945 had assured Congress that his compulsory health insurance plan was ‘not socialized 
medicine,’ by his February 1948 State of the Union Address he was telling a different story. In 
that address, Truman said ‘Our ultimate aim must be a comprehensive insurance system to 
protect all our people equally against insecurity and ill health,’ and that such a system must be 
compulsory in order to ‘equally protect all our people.’ Kem interpreted this specification as a 
clear indicator of “where Mr. Truman stands on socialized medicine,” despite the fact that 
“apparently he found the term distasteful.”	  75	  Senator Kem cast the president as disingenuous, 
suggesting Truman was attempting to sell the American people on something well outside the 
boundaries of acceptable American political culture.  
Kem aimed to expose Truman and his allies as agents who professed to distance 
themselves from the nomenclature of socialized medicine while painting the system as essential 
for the success of American healthcare. Kem equated ‘compulsory’ with ‘socialized’ in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare, 21. The new Republican Congress coincided not only with the start of 
Truman’s presidency but also with what Oberlander calls the third campaign for national health insurance. Unlike 
the hesitant Roosevelt, Truman supported the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, becoming the first president to endorse 
national health insurance.  
75  Statement by U.S. Senator James P. Kem, August 3rd, 1948, U.S. Senate, “Congressional Record - Senate, 80th 
Congress, Session 2. August 3rd, 1948” (1948).  
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arrive at his conclusion that Truman was deliberately unclear and thus misleading about his 
intentions. Truman’s preferred protection against “insecurity and ill health” invoked the language 
of the Social Security Era and the Great Depression, when protections against economic 
insecurity (the costs that come with illness) were the primary motivator in constructing the 
legislation. As Paul Starr notes, the “politics of health insurance revolve around four sorts of 
cost: 1) individual losses of income; 2) individual medical costs; 3) the indirect costs of illness to 
society; and 4) the social costs of medical care.”76 From the point of view of Truman, the 
derivative costs of health, direct and indirect, drove the debate about socialized medicine. For his 
opponents, this was not so; instead, they saw a dangerous rhetoric that sought to import failed 
ideas about health insurance from abroad into the United States. Truman was the first American 
president to formally endorse national health insurance,77 and knew Republican obstruction in 
the year of a general election “could be a valuable issue”78 with “favorable public opinion.”79 
 
The Hill-Burton Act After 1946 
A lot was at stake in a general election year, including American exceptionalism. Senator 
Kem cited a statement from party colleague, Republican Governor Dewey, who claimed that 
fledgling compulsory health insurance experiments in other nations had failed. In his view, such 
efforts had dragged countries down to the level of the Socialists, and that America risked losing 
its superior status if it attempted implementing the same system. However, it is unclear by what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making 
of a Vast Industry (Basic Books, 1983), (236). Reformers at this time were becoming increasingly aware of the 
many societal costs of poor health, or inaccessible health care. Lost wages and future health expenses were only two 
of the concerns; employers  
would also suffer from an unhealthy workforce. Difficulties for middle-class families who did not have health 
insurance were becoming more widespread as well.  
77 Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare. 21. 
78 Ibid., 22.  
79 Ibid. 
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parameters Dewey placed the American system above other nations’ attempts to deliver 
healthcare:  
Compulsory socialized medicine is no good. It cannot be done… I don’t want to run the 
risk of happening to the health of our people what has happened to the health of every 
group of people which has tried to drag the medical profession down to the Socialists’ 
level…You will enlarge the volume of medical care but you will utterly destroy the 
quality of medical care…This idea [that] you can improve medical care by passing a law 
must be stopped.80 
 
The elision regarding the passage of the Hill-Burton Act, which precisely aimed to improve 
medical care by passing a law, is remarkable. Dewey was also concerned with the tradeoff 
between quantity and quality, implying that there was no way to improve quantity of care 
provided without sacrificing the quality of care at that time. The editor of the Journal of the 
American Medical Association would present a different concern a few months later. Using 
Great Britain’s National Health Act as an example, Dr. Morris Fishbein wrote that national 
health insurance had resulted in a change in attitudes that threatened private insurance: “if a 
person can get free medical service, why should he pay for it? As a result…private medical 
practice has virtually disappeared since the Act went into effect.”81 Dr. Fishbein would agree 
with Governor Dewey about the ‘downward path’82 on which socialized medicine would lead a 
nation, but the threat to medical practice is more real for the physician than it is for the politician 
and presidential candidate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Statement by U.S. Senator James P. Kem, August 3rd, 1948. Congressional Proquest, Congressional Record - 
Senate, 80th Congress, Session 2. August 3rd, 1948. Dewey made his record of having protected ‘American 
medicine’ quite clear: “Accordingly I have spent the last two years of my life knocking down every proposal that 
anybody has made to regiment the medical profession and the people of America through any program of socialized 
medicine.” 
81 “Dr. Fishbein Assails Socialized Medicine,” The New York Times, December 7, 1948.  
82 Ibid. Dr. Fishbein had delivered a similar doomsday message in 1945 (reported in the Chicago Daily Tribune, 
“Fishbein Blasts Truman Health Plan as ‘Worst.’”) He said that socialized or state medicine was the first step 
towards “regimentation” of resources, and that this regimentation had led to Germany’s totalitarianism. He also 
attacked the language that Truman and his team had used to promote their proposals, calling it trite and unoriginal in 
the attempt to force the proposals on the American people. Perhaps the greatest offense committed by Truman and 
his team, however, was their neglecting to consult the AMA on their project.  
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Senator Kem also referred to the report of the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate’s 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the issue of compulsory health insurance. The April 
1948 report, issued in conjunction with the nonpartisan Brookings Institute, had four 
conclusions: first, that “ no great nation in the world has among its white population better health 
than now prevails in the United States;” second, that the United States, “under its voluntary 
system of medical care, has made greater progress in the application of medical and sanitary 
science than any other country;” third, that health disparities between whites and nonwhites were 
not “due to unavailability or inadequacy of medical care;” and fourth, that the advances in health 
among both the whites and nonwhites that have been made in the United States in the past four 
decades do not suggest basic defects in the American system.83 
The Committee’s conclusions centered on American exceptionalism in the outcomes that 
the American health system (and American research) offered. It also sought to shift 
responsibility for the poorer health of nonwhites from the system which treats (or refused to 
treat) nonwhites, including geographical inequities and structural racism, to these citizens 
themselves. Second, the report suggested a link between the ‘voluntary’ system of medical care 
and the progress that has been made under it; if not causal, then a facilitating environment that 
fostered scientific progress is definitely implied. The third point acknowledges a health 
discrepancy between races but does not hold the provision of medical care accountable. It is 
unclear if ‘unavailability of medical care’ refers to lack of access to it because of inability to pay 
or a lack of medical providers. Whereas Dewey conceded that there are improvements to be 
made in the ‘American system,’ this report concluded that any shortcomings in delivery or 
outcomes are not the responsibility of the American voluntary system. Despite its nonpartisan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Statement by U.S. Senator James P. Kem, August 3rd, 1948. Congressional Proquest, Congressional Record - 
Senate, 80th Congress, Session 2. August 3rd, 1948. 
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nature, this report fully supported Dewey’s opinions about the superiority of the American 
institutions and political culture; any change to private medical care and individual payment 
must then be viewed with suspicion.  
 Senator Kem and Governor Dewey emphasized the concerns that many doctors expressed 
about a national health insurance system. They cited the general superiority of the American 
healthcare system and the necessity for it to remain unique among the healthcare systems of the 
world, looking to health outcomes in its white population for proof. They joined Dr. Fishbein in 
listing the failed or failing attempts other nation-states had experienced in implementing national 
health insurance (Senator Kem’s example was New Zealand; Dr. Fishbein’s, Great Britain) and, 
despite their insistence on American superiority, expressed fear that the United States would go 
‘down’ the same path towards socialism. Each of the men predicted an adverse effect socialized 
medicine would have on the current system, from damaging the health of Americans to 
endangering American private insurance.  
Yet their objections to a comprehensive socialized medical system did not include 
references to constitutional concerns about mechanisms that would bring in the forty-eight states 
under a federal infrastructure of healthcare. Republicans Senator Kem and Governor Dewey 
focused on the macro-level effects of national health insurance efforts, treating a nation as a unit. 
Earlier in this section, their points seemed to conflict with the idea of the Hill-Burton Act and its 
aim to improve the American healthcare system by increasing federal oversight. When it was 
drafted, its main architect, Senator Lister Hill of Alabama, stressed, “that the principle of states’ 
rights and local initiative be preserved and encouraged is essential to the success of any health 
program.”84 Despite the provisions of the Act, Senator Hill made the role of the states the focal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Beatrix Hoffmann, Healthcare for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States since 1930 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 74. From “Statement by U.S. Senator Lister Hill of Alabama before the 
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point of the legislation. He had a consistent record of citing states’ rights in the Constitution as 
reason for action or inaction on the part of the federal government; in discussing poll taxes in 
1948, he declared that the decision to outlaw poll taxes on a federal level would “be to rape the 
Constitution of the United States; and if the Congress should once commit this rape…no one 
could foretell... how many rapes there might be of the rights of the States as safeguarded by the 
Constitution.”85 This extreme, gendered language portrayed the Constitution as a vulnerable 
entity, even as it protected individual states from the excesses of government. Further, it 
suggested that Congress itself could be a danger to the Constitution, the very document that 
authorizes its existence and which Congress was sworn to protect.  
Senator Hill voiced his support for causes like improving the health outcomes of African 
Americans, but only to the extent that his interpretation of the Constitution and of the 10th 
Amendment allowed the federal government to take measures to do so.86 His commitment to the 
states (and especially to his own state of Alabama) shaped his construction of the Act.87 Hill-
Burton’s priority was not the prestige of the medical profession, but its emphasis on the 
infrastructure of the healthcare system; bolstering the rights of the states to use federal dollars 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Committee on Education and Labor of the Senate in Support of the Hospital Construction Bill, February 26, 1945,” 
Folder 1.11, Series 17.11, Dean’s Administrative Files, UAB Archives. Hill meant what he said quite literally. 
According to Hoffmann, Hill intentionally engineered the bill to disproportionately benefit rural areas, or his native 
South. Federal funds were allotted to meet what was required for a certain person-to-hospital-bed ratio, and rural 
states had more to gain.   
85 Statement by U.S. Senator Lister Hill, August 3rd, 1948. Congressional Proquest, Congressional Record - Senate, 
80th Congress, Session 2. August 3rd, 1948. 
86 Hoffman, Healthcare for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States since 1930, 74. 
87 Ibid. 
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Isidore Falk and the Research of Socialized Medicine  
 
Since the late 1930s, the Social Security Board/Administration drew together a new 
generation of social scientists and public health experts to generate research and data that would 
undergird development of social welfare policies and programs. Long part of the New Deal 
network, Isidore Falk became the Director of the Bureau of Research and Statistics at the Social 
Security Administration after World War II. A native of Brooklyn, New York, Falk worked at a 
laboratory in the Department of Public Health at the Yale School of Medicine in order to pay his 
way through college.88 Eventually, he matriculated at Yale in 1917, and graduated in 1920 from 
the Sheffield Scientific School with a degree of bachelor of philosophy, magna cum laude.89 
Staying on at Yale for graduate studies, Falk’s thesis was on the subject of bacteriology, with a 
focus on the chemical and physical properties of dying bacteria.90   
After a stint as an instructor at the Yale School of Public Health, Falk left for the 
University of Chicago, where he taught courses in bacteriology, immunology, vital statistics, and 
public health. He left his tenure at the university at the end of fall 1929 to take an appointment 
with the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care,91 which would go on to publish the landmark 
1932 report (“Final Report,” or “Medical Care for the American People,” of the Committee on 
the Costs of Medical Care), the first comprehensive study of national health expenditures and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025),” § Subcommittee on Health; Committee on Labor and 




89 Ibid., (1695). Falk notes that some people do address him as Doctor, though he does not encourage it, since he 
works in a field relevant to medicine and the term may cause some confusion as to whether he is a doctor of 
medicine.  
90 Ibid., (1698). Here, Senator Donnell asks Falk if his thesis was not in some way related to influenza – perhaps 
because of the timing of Falk’s graduate studies after the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic.  
91 Ibid., (1700).  
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their trends in the United States since the 1910 Flexner Report.92 The points of the Committee’s 
Report that Falk anticipated would generate the most opposition were “that medical care could 
be more effectively provided through groups rather than solo practices and that the costs of care 
could be best met through some sort of voluntary group prepayment arrangement”93 that would 
dilute the risk for an individual on such a plan. Naturally, Dr. Morris Fishbein, the head of the 
American Medical Association, denounced the report. In 1936, Falk joined the Social Security 
Board as the Head Medical Economist for the Board.  
On July 23, 1947, Isidore Falk – at the time, was asked to come to testify on the subject 
of medical insurance for the Senate subcommittee on Health, of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare.  This testimony is important for several reasons, not the least of which is that it 
is somewhat autobiographical. It gives context for the correspondence and writings of a figure 
whom the historian Jill Quadagno describes as a “quiet, competent, and politically liberal 
professor”94 who had worked on the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC) for five 
years. In her book For All These Rights, the historian Jennifer Klein notes that the CCMC 
“emphasized that the solution to the health problems and economic security problems of workers 
could be resolved through health insurance that would help families pay for individual medical 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Thomas B. Gore, “A Forgotten Landmark Medical Study from 1932 by the Committee on the Costs of Medical 
Care,” Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings 26, no. 2 (April 2013): 142–43. 
93 Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health Insurance. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-Private Welfare State 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 121. 
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Marjorie Shearon and a Blueprint for Discrediting Falk  
National health insurance opponents decided to dig into Falk’s past and his transition 
from academic to government research in order to discredit his testimony. A pamphlet 
distributed during his testimony on July 23 titled “A Blueprint for the Nationalization of 
Medicine: Plans to Enchain Medicine by Unwarranted Regulative Interference”96 sought to 
personally discredit Falk, Arthur Altmeyer, and other key members of the SSA, as well as the 
health insurance proposal itself. The author of the Blueprint, Marjorie Shearon, was a former 
employee of the Social Security Administration. Her discontent with the Board apparently 
stemmed to 1939, when “Falk had refused to publish her report on the constitutionality of the 
social security program.”97After leaving the Social Security Board, Shearon became the research 
analyst for the Republican State Minority Conference and worked closely with conservative 
Senator Robert Taft. In her writing, Shearon cast Falk as a figure with potential to allow his 
ambitions to get in the way of research, or to invalidate such research. Presented in its entirety at 
the Senate hearing, this Blueprint maps out the impossibility for the proponents of socialized 
medicine to also uphold American ideals that fundamentally conflict with those required for a 
system of compulsory, nationalized medicine.  
First, the Blueprint begins by establishing the Webster Dictionary’s definitions of 
“socialism,” “state socialism,” and “state medicine” as the working definitions for the rest of the 
indictment against Falk and his coworkers. By “aiming to replace competition by cooperation”98 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025). The Blueprint was authored by Marjorie Shearon, a 
legislative consultant and a consultant for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 
97 Jaap Kooijman, ...And the Pursuit of National Health: The Incremental Strategy Toward National Health 
Insurance in the United States of America, Amsterdam Monographs in American Studies (Rodopi Bv Editions, 
1999), 113. The resulting antagonism became both bitter and mutual. With regards to Shearon’s attitude, Falk 
complained that “it was as though someone had throttled her infant at birth or in its cradle, and she apparently never 
forgave any of us for this series of events.” He also called her a “professional fear and smear-monger who had no 
respect for truth or integrity.” 
98 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025), 1706. 
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and to “equalize incomes and opportunity”99 via mechanisms like compulsory sickness 
insurance, proponents of socialized medicine ostensibly “favored a great extension of 
governmental action,”100 especially in the cases of policy. The Webster definition of ‘state’ 
medicine that followed was succinct: “medical treatment provided or controlled by a government 
and subsidized by public funds,”101 with public funds including income taxes, social security 
taxes, premiums, or contributions. Importantly, under this mechanism of public funds, doctors 
would become salaried employees of the government, as was the case in Great Britain at the 
time.  
In the Blueprint Shearon directly juxtaposed the idea of the socialized state as theorized 
or executed in Hitler’s Mein Kampf and the Social Security Administration of the United 
States,102 conflating fascism and socialism as the same authoritarianism, warning “people failed 
to take seriously the avowed intentions of Hitler” and that the danger for a similar scenario in the 
United States vis-à-vis the Social security Administration existed.  According to Shearon, the 
“infiltration by Socializers into the Federal Government”103 had occurred between 1935 and 
1947 after years of acquiring research about medical economics and public finance. These 
Socializers (who apparently comprised a conspiratorial “House of Falk”104) were committed to 
reviving previous efforts to follow a propaganda plan in order to disseminate the ideas for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. Shearon carefully chose her words according to the Webster definitions of state medicine and socialism.  
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 1707. Falk definitely held that Shearon’s views were one of extreme paranoia. However, Jaap Kooijman 
points out that her views were indeed influential. She was the darling of conservative congressmen and members of 
the AMA. Her efforts continued until Falk’s resignation from the Social Security Board in 1954.  
103 Ibid. In 1940 (during this period of supposed infiltration), Falk had given a talk titled “What is Americanism?” at 
the Baltimore Open Forum. He wanted to highlight the connection between American ideals and collective security, 
and the right to be free from wants, as Roosevelt had said in previous years. This talk foreshadowed the attacks Falk 
would sustain from self-proclaimed protectors of American ideals like Shearon.  
104 Jaap Kooijman, ...And the Pursuit of National Health: The Incremental Strategy Toward National Health 
Insurance in the United States of America, 113. Shearon actually had a diagram outlining the “House,” which 
described the many “lines of control” originating from the “mid-level official.” See Derickman, “The House of Falk: 
The Paranoid Style in American Health Politics,” American Journal of Public Health November 1997: Vol. 87, No. 
11, 1836-1843. 
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socialized medicine into the American mainstream. What Shearon neglected to mention here is 
the dual role of social protection that Paul Starr describes in The Social Transformation of 
American Medicine; Starr notes that social insurance in this iteration “departed from the earlier 
paternalism…by providing a right to benefits instead of charity.” The new demand for 
compulsory contributions was certainly “an extension of obligations,”105 but it also “constituted 
an extension to social welfare of liberal principles of civil and political rights.”106 
Isidore Falk’s opponents or critics (including Shearon) clearly were most concerned 
about the question of rights, but in a different capacity.  They feared that Falk and his mentor, 
Michael Marks Davis, had actively consolidated the scattered pushes for social reform “and 
gradually [taken] over the program for socialization of medicine in the United States”107 in the 
years between 1926 and 1934, and, after the auspicious coincidence of the Great Depression’s 
beginnings, the New Deal, and the rise of labor,108 had begun a massive propaganda campaign 
ever since the passage of Social Security. Actually, Davis had been encouraged by the positive 
response of the American Medical Association back in 1915 to “hope that America might be able 
to ‘improve on’ Britain and Germany in the organization of services”109 and delivery of medical 
insurance. His visit to the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota had inspired him with many ideas about 
medical organization that would make sure that if health insurance were “tied to a system of 
individualized private practice”110 like many physicians preferred, “cooperative medical work in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making 
of a Vast Industry. 
106 Ibid. 
107 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025). 
108 Ibid., 1710.  
109 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making 
of a Vast Industry, 247.  
110 Ibid. Physicians apparently equated organization with “a bureaucratic hierarchy” that would “subordinate” them 
under officials and policies that were not medical experts.  
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diagnosis and treatment”111 would come along as well. Ultimately, however, the attitude of the 
American Medical Association was heavily dependent on physicians’ preferences for indemnity 
payment under health insurance, and this obscured the benefits of reforming medical work 
dealing in diagnosis and treatment.  
Equally uncertain between 1926 and 1935 was the stance of the American labor 
movement. Samuel Gompers, the president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), had 
“repeatedly denounced compulsory health insurance as an unnecessary, paternalistic reform that 
would create a system of state supervision of the people’s health.”112 Once the New Deal was in 
motion, the AFL did not have a uniform opinion regarding this matter, especially with the rising 
popularity and success of Social Security; in fact, by 1948 (a year after this particular session of 
Falk’s testimony in the Senate) the AFL and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
released a joint statement relating their “staunch support for a national social insurance program 
with provisions for medical care.”113 The AFL and the CIO wanted a medical program that is 
“broad in scope, encourages preventative medicine, and assures high quality of care.”114 
According to Shearon’s accusations, Isidore Falk had spent much of his time “wooing” labor and 
giving talks with titles such as “Formulating an American Plan of Health Insurance”115 for 
groups like the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) or the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), to extract support such as the above. Not surprisingly, Falk had attempted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Ibid. Physicians strongly objected “to any form of contract practice as a result of their experience with fraternal 
lodges and industrial firms that forced them to bid against each other for group business.” What terrible experience 
physicians had with these ‘lodges’ is unclear, but this objection meant that they strongly preferred to be paid per 
visit instead of per capita, or the number of patients who signed up to be seen by them per year.  
112 Ibid., 249.  
113 Franz Goldmann, “Labor’s Attitude toward Health Insurance,” ILR Review 2, no. 1 (October 1948): 90–98, 
doi:10.2307/2519259. Apparently, both the AFL and the CIO had both officially expressed support for pertinent 
bills introduced in Congress in 1939, 1943, 1945, and 1947. Labor’s goal for a health insurance program was for it 
to be “broad in scope, encourag[e] preventive medicine, and assur[e] high quality of care.” Cost is conspicuously 
missing from labor’s list of concerns; as a lobbying force, perhaps cost was not their top priority – after all, 
legislation had to transform into law for cost to kick in.  
114 Ibid. 
115 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025). 
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gauge potential responses to or support from different sectors just before Senator Robert Wagner 
and Representatives Robert Doughton and John Lewis of the House Ways and Means Committee 
introduced their 1935 economic security bill. But, strategically and ideologically linking at 
domestic political institution (AALL) with an international one (ILO), by Shearon, was meant to 
discredit the health insurance project as “non-American” or even “un-American.”116 
 
The Wagner Bills  
A curious clause and editing process made the “Wagner-Doughton” Bill significant, 
according to Falk’s skeptics. The original bill introduced by Wagner, Doughton and Lewis had 
apparently included a clause that listed the research of health insurance as one of the duties of the 
Social Security Board in section 402. (This clause made sense, since the Committee on 
Economic Security’s reports such as “Risks to Economic Security Arising from Ill Health” were 
providing the basis for compulsory health insurance proposals given to Roosevelt117). In other 
words, President Roosevelt had expressly stated he would not pursue health insurance 
architecture in the 1935 bill, but its authors inserted a requirement for the Social Security Board 
to study it. After an amendment or two, this clause was removed (the newer version of the bill, 
introduced on April 4, 1935, did not have this clause),118 and eventually this bill became the 
Social Security Act in August 1935. Retrospectively, then, individuals like Shearon could claim 
that Congress had specifically weighed the debate of whether or not the Social Security Board 
(later, the Social Security Administration) “was to have a mandate to study health insurance, and 
decided in the negative.”119 This was certainly a setback for Falk. He would start preparing for 
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118 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025), 1715.  
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the next wave of a peaking in interest for government-provided or government-subsidized 
sickness insurance, which, after the early years of the Roosevelt administration, would come 
again in the early 1940s.120 
By 1943, after some more planning and campaigning on Falk’s part, the “stage was set 
for the long-planned, all-out attempt to force through Congress a comprehensive social insurance 
law. ‘Now or never!’ Was the slogan.”121 That year, the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill was 
introduced in Congress.122 Critics made various allegations about the true nature of this bill and 
others like it. They alleged that power struggles engulfed the rollout of the bill: “When the [first] 
Wagner-Murray Bill was introduced on June 3, 1943, a great hue and cry was raised about the 
alleged power that would be given to the Surgeon General... However, Falk who drafted the 
compulsory sickness insurance provisions without consulting the Surgeon General, presumably 
had no intention of granting any power to him.”123 They also claimed that there existed at least 
one other version of the 1943 bill; the one that had been introduced by Senator Wagner called the 
“A.F. of L” bill (for American Federation of Labor), and the second known by members of 
Falk’s staff as “our bill,” or the Social Security Board’s bill.124 Falk allegedly used the second 
bill to mislead Surgeon General Parran and lead him to believe that he was being consulted for 
this legislation, despite his exclusion described above.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Jonathan Engel, Poor People’s Medicine: Medicaid and American Charity Care since 1965 (Duke University 
Press, 2006), 29. 
121 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025), 1716. Falk also assisted legal counsel to the president 
in formulating a message on national health insurance. Truman would deliver this message in 1945; the second 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill would incorporate Falk’s research and Truman’s message. 
122 Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare, 21. Oberlander rather cheekily observes that starting in 1943, the 
“introduction of national health insurance legislation in Congress [by Wagner, Murray, and Dingell] became an 
annual event.” Importantly, the 1943 bill contained both a federal (national) health insurance program and a joint 
federal-state hospital construction program, reminiscent of the ‘mixed system’ that Witte had written about a few 
years before.  
123National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025), 1717.  
124 National Health Program, Part 4 (HRG-1947-LPW-0025)., 1717. This claim was made in the footnotes of 
Shearon’s Blueprint for the Nationalization of Medicine: Plans to Enchain Medicine by Unwarranted Regulative 
Interference.  
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Just how “complicit” Senator Wagner was in the Falk “clique’s conspiracy” to push the 
socialized medicine agenda onto legislative efforts is unclear. Based on the information that 
Wagner failed to disclose to the Senate, Shearon claimed, the “leading health experts” that Falk 
often cites in the legislation were often not physicians but rather academics who had never 
practiced medicine in the United States, or were figures associated with “foundations long active 
in the movement to socialize medicine” and longtime allies of Falk and Davis.125 Some were 
even indirectly linked back to the menace presented by Mein Kampf: it was noted that a Dr. 
Goldmann, a professor of public health at Yale University and the author of Labor’s Attitude 
toward Health Insurance above, was born and raised in Berlin and had worked with the Health 
Section of the League of Nations. He had also written works on “Public Medical Care” and on 
German sickness insurance benefits for the International Labor Organization.126 Dr. Goldmann’s 
heritage alone made Falk’s association with him suspect in the years immediately following the 
Second World War. Nazis and Soviets, Germans and Russians could be balled up into one 
nebulous, but ominous, totalitarian threat.  
The American Medical Association certainly had its own complaints about the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell Bill and the supporting documents Wagner referenced. For example, the AMA 
claimed that the 1944 statement “Medical Care in a National Health Program” had been adopted 
by the American Public Health Association via an undemocratic process, without the votes of all 
of the active members and fellows of the association. The dissatisfaction with a “shrewdly 
manipulated performance by public officials, economists, [and] bureaucrats”127 echoes the main 
complaint that the American Medical Association and its allies would voice about national health 
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127 Ibid. This characterization recalls Dr. Morris Fishbein’s complaint that bureaucrats had engineered their program 
without consulting members of the AMA. See note 75 on page 26 of this paper. 
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insurance as a whole for decades to come. They disliked the implicit assumption that a single 
central agency (“a bureaucratic machine”128) would handle all the administrative details of all 
public health activities and all medical activities on a federal level. Although bureaucracies, of 
course, managed even local and state governments, the generic term “bureaucratic” was turned 
into a sinister, unconstitutional one that implied rigid centralized authority of a socialized state.  
Falk’s critics were most committed to proving that Falk’s longtime agenda to establish 
socialized medicine in the United States was rivaled only by his desire to control every aspect of 
its research and administration. They claimed that he was “assumed active leadership in 
discussing administration and financing of the hospital construction program”129 as the main 
consultant for the committee formulating what would become the Hill-Burton Act. It was not 
only his penchant for producing statistical tables for this project that irked his critics, but also his 
directing the Bureau of Research and Statistics to “furnish one document after another showing 
the ‘need’ for compulsory sickness insurance, the ‘need’ for Government intervention, and the 
way in which the proposed scheme would ‘operate.’”130 Here, the historian Beatrix Hoffmann 
would disagree with Falk’s critics’ assessment of his contribution to the Hill-Burton effort. 
Hoffmann writes that the Hill-Burton Act was actually a politically palatable alternative to 
national health insurance, since it was a “juggernaut, seemingly bulletproof”131 – after all, no one 
could possibly be against hospital construction and expanding access to healthcare nationwide. 
The Act instead expanded the presence of federal dollars in American healthcare in the form of 
new hospital buildings, and simultaneously successfully avoided the question of expanding the 
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129 Ibid., 1721.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Beatrix Hoffman, Healthcare for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States since 1930 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 69. Opponents of Truman’s national health program liked the Hill-Burton Act 
because “it tackled health care shortages without inviting government intervention, and national insurance experts 
also supported it because they had included hospital construction…in the reform platform as far back as 1938.”  
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right to care, which would have required an expansion of access. Historian Jonathan Engel would 
agree; he writes that proposals to improve healthcare during this time period “shied away from 
the provision of clinical care,”132 because the idea of government involvement in clinical care 
was a politically volatile one (“research, construction, public health works, and infant 
immunizations were politically palatable; government doctors were less so”133). According to 
Hoffmann, “In the Hill-Burton program a formula for grant allocation and statutory prohibition 
of federal intervention in hospital policy limited political discretion;” instead, “states’ rights and 
community autonomy were invoked as the basis for limiting federal intervention. These claims 
have a constitutional heritage behind them.”134 ‘Federal dollars and local control’ was the theme 
of the legislation.   
So explosive was the idea of government involvement in medical care that its proponents 
were automatically labeled as conspirators who used “stealth and adroit maneuvering” to 
“jockey” the nation “into acceptance of a national compulsory sickness insurance scheme 
because the true meaning of the legislation would be concealed from the people and even from 
Members of Congress.”135 Always one step of legislators themselves, these masterminds 
allegedly even were able to execute a bait-and-switch and evolve their demands: “Plans for 
socialization of medicine now call for nationalization rather than for State action which was the 
goal in 1939 and earlier.”136 Falk’s role in all of these accusations was, according to Marjorie 
Shearon, providing “leadership for the nationalization movement; integrating lobbying 
movements inside and outside Government; …supervising drafting [of compulsory sickness 
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insurance proposals]; manipulating committee findings,”137 and more. (Falk never formally 
studied economics, although he wrote extensively on medical economics in books like Security 
Against Sickness: A Study of Health Insurance (1936), and was appointed as the principal 
medical economist at the Social Security Board in 1937 after confirmation by the Senate.)138 
Falk asked for an opportunity to leave a record of his commentary of Marjorie Shearon 
and her allies’ “malicious and unfair and untruthful attack”142 contained in the Blueprint for the 
Nationalization of Medicine.  The attack on his level of expertise was not as grave or extensive a 
charge as the implication that he had or represented a hidden agenda, as was suggested by the 
articles that her camp introduced into the record, including Labor’s Program to Socialize 
Medicine Internationally – Wagner Bill Revealed as a Product of the International Labor 
Organization from Medical Economics in 1945.143 The level of publicity for such titles was 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Ibid.,1723.  
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general, the provision of medical services for “needy and medically needy” persons, the “financial burden and the 
economic insecurity” which sickness creates even for those who are not indigent, and the problem of income loss 
resulting from disability.  
The birth of health economics as a field is often attributed to a landmark 1963 paper by the economist Kenneth 
Arrow, entitled “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care” and published in the American Economic 
Review. Years after Falk’s arguments for the responsibility of the federal and state governments to intervene in 
health insurance, Arrow made a case for the necessity of intervention in a market where failures like asymmetric 
information frequently arise.  
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included the House Subcommittee on Government Publicity and Propaganda, the chair of which led an investigation 
into the alleged propaganda activities of the Truman administration. (Ironically, Kooijman writes, the committee’s 
first target was Surgeon General Parran, whom Shearon claimed Falk had snubbed in policymaking.) Truthfully, 
Shearon’s attacks found validity in the fact that “the national health insurance movement had indeed been led by a 
small group of reformers.” Falk hated the idea of getting caught up in the crossfires of politics, but could not escape 
this fact. See ...And the Pursuit of National Health: The Incremental Strategy Toward National Health Insurance in 
the United States of America, 114. 
143 Ibid. 
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Franz Goldmann, Labor, and Suspicion  
Franz Goldmann, a professor of public health first at Yale and then at Harvard in the 
1930s and 40s, was one of the targets of opponents of “socialized medicine” for his research on 
the relationship between labor and health insurance in America as well as in Britain. (Both sides 
of the argument were fond of referring to Great Britain as an example and template of what 
could go wrong, or right, with national health insurance.) Goldmann wrote in 1939 that “in all 
civilized countries some medical care is supported by taxation, [which] is used for three 
purposes: (1) To carry out the campaign against specific diseases of social and economic 
importance; (2) to protect certain groups exposed to health dangers due to their…socioeconomic 
conditions; (3) to establish and maintain institutional facilities ad professional services for all the 
people.”144 In this writing, he suggested that taxation collected by the government had a distinct 
role to play in the delivery of health insurance and in realizing it as a reality for people of 
different occupations or socioeconomic backgrounds. He envisioned the federal government as 
an intermediary that transforms taxation dollars into public health campaigns, prevention efforts, 
and institution building, respectively – this trend was taking shape in Great Britain.145 Starting 
with the control of acute communicable disease, which all Americans seemed to agree was the 
responsibility of the government, the British government had taken steps to expand its role in 
public health.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Franz Goldmann, “Recent Developments in Tax-Supported Medical Care in Great Britain” 1939, MS 1318 Box 
1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. 
145 Goldmann, “Recent Developments in Tax-Supported Medical Care in Great Britain.” Goldmann wrote that the 
British story in pursuing this three-prong application of tax funds for healthcare is full of interesting details and 
history, but they reveal two key points: “there has been a steady growth in government responsibility for organizing 
and providing medical care – a growth expressed by the increasing number and improved quality of tax-supported 
facilities and services for the sick.” In addition, “there has been a slow but final abandonment of the proviso 
‘destitution’ as the sole basis of eligibility for medical care at public expense” – in other words, indigence as a 
prerequisite for government-provided care was falling out of favor.   
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Goldmann was aware that “the development of a broad and well-balanced program of 
medical care has been curbed by heterogeneous concepts of the extent of government 
responsibility, has been sterilized by antiquated laws, and has been seriously handicapped by 
lack of planning and integration”148 – a challenge not unique to the United States, but a stinging 
rebuke of the American reluctance to address the issues with the same determination that Britain 
had. In his writings on what American medicine and healthcare meant to the farmer, or on 
evaluating union health programs, Goldmann brought in a key player in the discussion about 
disability and health insurance  - namely, that of organized labor in America. Whereas Jill 
Quadagno argues that the absence of a strong labor movement in America has contributed to the 
failure of health insurance efforts in the United States,149 it seems instead that the fact that 
different branches of labor were unable to agree on a united stance towards such proposals 
contributed to the stalemate. In Goldmann’s article Labor’s Attitude Towards Health Insurance, 
he predicted an “increase in collective bargaining agreements with provisions for ‘health 
insurance,’”150 suggesting that some of the different labor groups’ objectives were nevertheless 
the same.  
 
Strategy and the American Medical Association  
The conservative coalition that had formed in 1937 in opposition to President Roosevelt’s 
perceived overreach and accused him of attempting to destroy the “constitutional separation of 
powers,” in the midst of post-war inflation, rode to power by taking Congress in the 1946 
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elections.151 Unable to contain their pressure and seeking some accommodation, the rather 
inexperienced President Truman began to dismantle the most interventionist war-time measurers 
in the New Deal mold such as the Office of Price Administration and the Committee on Fair 
Employment Practices. This same conservative coalition aligned itself with the American 
Medical Association (AMA) in between 1946 and 1950 to guarantee the defeat of Truman’s 
1949 and 1950 national health insurance recommendations.152 This rejection of Truman’s 
policies and the Fair Deal would have been especially painful for him, because he had been 
“troubled by seeing so many sick people unable to get the care they need, turned away from 
hospitals because they had no money”153 and rejected by physicians as well – contributing to a 
“strong feeling”154 that Truman would remember about their negative attitudes, which in turn 
informed his prioritization of health insurance. This antagonism clashed with a postwar trend 
noted by Paul Star in The Social Transformation of American Medicine, in which “both liberal 
and medical opinion supported a broad mandate for professional authority,”155 creating an 
“alliance” especially in an era of unprecedented medical and economic expansion in the postwar 
years.  
Long before 1949 and Cold War escalation, however, the AMA had engineered effective 
methods of opposition to many ideas put forth about any form of national health insurance that 
was not private insurance. According to Jill Quadagno, it was the “intransigence” of the AMA 
regarding voluntary insurance that had convinced Isidore Falk to push for a compulsory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See Julian E. Zelizer, The Fierce Urgency of Now - Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the Battle for the Great 
Society (New York: Penguin Press, 2015). 
152 Ibid., 18-19.  
153 Quadagno, One Nation Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health Insurance, 9. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making 
of a Vast Industry. 
	   46	  
government program for the rest of his career.156 While the AMA did not represent all physicians 
as individuals, it was becoming an increasingly powerful political entity.  
Yet its collective mode of action also raised legal issues. Thus the constitutional or legal 
questions about a modernizing medical sector applied not only to questions of insurance but also 
to the monopolization of care. In 1942, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued the AMA, charging 
that it had violated antitrust law (the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act) in the late 1930s by attempting 
to prohibit its members from working for health maintenance organizations (a type of insurance 
grouping) like the Group Health Association.157 This lawsuit set up the controversial question of 
whether a physician’s practice of his profession constitutes trade under the Sherman Act.158 The 
Supreme Court agreed with the DOJ, based on the holding that “the fact that the defendants were 
physician and medical organizations is of no significance if the purpose and effect of their 
conspiracy was obstruction and restraint of the business of Group Health.”159 There was clearly 
no love lost between the physician organization and the Justice Department, which was not 
convinced by the American Medical Associations’ argument that it did not, and could not, 
engage in the same collusive behavior that was usually accused of in corporations. Truman’s 
relationship with the AMA was not likely to have been very warm either based on his 
experiences. This meant that combined with the Social Security Supreme Court cases of the 
1930s, the AMA had little history of legal success at the nation’s highest court. Without a 
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therefore wanted to ensure that others had early medical intervention and advances in medical research reached 
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precedent of success, the AMA did not launch attacks on socialized medicine initiatives on 
which they could hope to construct a strong constitutional argument against such initiatives.  
The AMA’s issues with the concept of national health insurance did not dwell on the 
constitutionality of proposals for its expansion. Yet their rhetoric melded well with what Truman 
decried as the propaganda of “die-hard reactionaries,”160 or “those who want to cripple labor 
unions…[and] who started a campaign of confusion against all…measures for the welfare of the 
people. [These reactionaries] say they are for extending and improving social security – but they 
call our proposals a bureaucratic system that will destroy the character of every American.”161 
These reactionaries also lamented the change that could occur over a few months: “In June of 
1948, compulsory health insurance…was considered by many as only a remote possibility… The 
result of the November [1948] election has completely reversed the prospect.”162 The fear that 
“compulsory health insurance…is an imminent probability”163 mobilized the campaign against 
Truman’s initiatives in 1949 and 1950.  
Following some criticism from “middle of the road” physicians who chastised the 
American Medical Association for “its failure to come forward with a comprehensive, 
constructive plan [an alternative to presidential proposals] to extend and improve medical 
care,”164 the AMA proposed a twelve-point program as a substitute for national health insurance 
legislation. The Journal of the AMA stated that “this program is far more comprehensive than 
any yet proposed by either the President of the United States or the Federal Security 
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Administration,”165 but it admitted that the plan to then set up “general standards for medical 
care”166 based on new guidelines was lacking. The AMA, then, did not produce a comprehensive 
alternative to compulsory health insurance, despite characterizing the latter as a danger to the 
doctor-patient relationship, American medicine, and physicians’ livelihoods. The organization 
was certainly not a legal one – instead, its most effectives weapons at swaying popular opinion 
relied on the cultivation of the American system of private insurance as a sacred one that must be 
protected from bureaucracy, much in the same way that politicians felt that the American system 
of insurance must be protected against foreign influences.  
 
Conclusion 
The Physicians Forum Bulletin for March-April 1949 reprinted a Barnaby Comic from 
the New York Star. It depicted a boy describing a dragon named “socialized medicine” to a 
curious friend. He explained, “Dragons, in our culture, are believed to be of no use to Man. 
Except for their metaphorical value. And, invariably, the intent in any prosopopoeial 
[personified] use of a Dragon is to portray some abstract concept or other as onerous, indeed, 
even evil. And, so, the bias against a really useful specie perpetuates.”167 This bias, utterly toxic 
to reform efforts in the Roosevelt and Truman years, has prevailed to the present day.  
The portrayal of national health insurance as socialized medicine, and of its proponents as 
anti-American or deep threats to American values, was as significant a barrier to the effort for 
national health insurance as the combined efforts of the AMA and the conservative coalition that 
was skeptical of FDR, of his advisors like Isidore Falk, and the continuing fruition of the New 
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the AMA’s aversion to federal oversight) as well as an attempt to redefine eligibility for government insurance with 
a more conservative approach.  
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Deal’s broader social democratic potential. The failure of a precedent like Social Security and 
social insurance to gain traction on the national level was not entirely due to some very effective 
propaganda campaign by the AMA, although their efforts were indeed significant. Instead, the 
failure of the AMA to work with the federal government to find a mutually beneficial approach 
to reducing risk for groups of individuals led to the stagnation of health reform in the years 
following the Second World War.  
The meaning, discourse, and orientation of liberalism perhaps altered course as a result of 
the alliance of Cold War politics and social welfare politics. The basis for this alliance emerged 
long before the Cold War, and even before the end of the Second World War. The conservative 
backlash to what seemed to liberals to be a natural progression of the responsibilities of the 
welfare state after the Depression-era resulted in a stalemate where conservatives contended that 
public health insurance initiatives, if not unconstitutional, were anti-American. Legal precedents 
from FDR’s era established the constitutionality of social insurance programs, and conservatives 
and the AMA turned to emotional and personal attacks in order to prevent more from becoming 
law.  
  This conversation and the ideological tensions surrounding it did not end with the 
passage of Medicare in the 1960s. Revisited in each decade since, with each landmark legislation 
that expands health insurance nationwide, there has been fierce debate and regression - the most 
recent example, of course, is the Republican failure to repeal the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. Today, the threat of “communism” is not nearly as significant of an 
argument against expanding healthcare coverage or the role of the government in regulating 
insurance markets in the states. However, the legacy of an intense paranoia of the overreach of 
government in something as ‘intimate’ as healthcare and medicine persists, despite the fact that 
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the healthcare sector in America comprises seventeen percent of the gross domestic product and 
a significant portion of the federal budget, with expenditures growing continuously. The United 
States remains an exception in the developed world in its historical inability to reconcile health 
security as a right with the role of the government that such a right would require.  
Isidore Falk once told his critics, “The phrase ‘socialized medicine’ means little or much. 
It has many different implications for those who use it and to those who hear it. It would be only 
by chance that I could guess what it means to you.”168 Reformers today would do well to 
remember his words and what different meanings ‘national heath reform’ holds for legislators, 
for economists, for physicians, and for Americans as a whole. National health insurance need not 
be a foreign concept, nor a dragon-like metaphorical one – the United States still has a unique 
opportunity to realize it.  
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Bibliographical Essay 
  
As an Economics major at Yale, I became increasingly intrigued by a field I did not know 
existed before coming to college: health economics. Health economics seemed, and still seems, 
to be the field that perhaps has the best shot at illuminating the intricate details that characterize 
the imperiled American healthcare system. I learned some basic tenets in courses dealing with 
health economics: one, that the relationship between healthcare and health is neither causal nor 
linear; two, that healthcare (or demand for medical care) does not function like other goods – 
hence the need for the field to study what it means to have a certain supply (of health stock), or 
to invest in health. Other debates driving research in this field deal with how to measure returns 
to investment in health, or how to finance the perpetually burgeoning cost of healthcare and 
medical care. I have researched the economics of collaboration in the American pharmaceutical 
industry and helped conduct small randomized control trials to incentivize participants to quit 
smoking. Yet I became caught up by a more fundamental question: why our society, which has 
such strong ideals of natural rights and extensive commitments of state aid to citizens, has not 
combined the two in the context of healthcare and its provision. Relatively late in college, I 
decided to major in History, not only because I loved the subject generally but also to be able to 
further pursue this profound, and indeed urgent, question.  
There are many points in U.S. history in which I could have begun to study the 
emergence of public health efforts and involvement at the federal or local level in the provision 
of medical care. I was determined, however, to start with the question of our rather tortured 
history of attempting to establish a national health insurance system. There certainly exists a 
wealth of material on this topic, as well as plenty of historical reasons why a uniform, 
comprehensive system never has become law. Today, ‘healthcare in the United States’ is nearly 
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synonymous with bureaucratic red tape, overlapping and redundant private enterprises and 
services, and excessive spending (an increasing rate of growth in addition to the level of 
spending overall), with mediocre results. As someone who was thirteen when Barack Obama 
was first elected president, I have grown up hearing about the Affordable Care Act and the 
continued tug-of-war over it from the legislative branch and the judicial branch of our federal 
government (including National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), which 
upheld the major provisions of the ACA.)  
I wanted to know if the aversion to extending the single payer system from Medicare to 
the rest of the population was an American attitude; Jill Quadagno argues that it is in One Nation 
Uninsured: Why the U.S. Has No National Health Insurance. She argues that four factors have 
worked together to ensure that the United States would never establish such a system: a strong 
sense of antistatism or distrust of the government, the absence of a strong labor movement, the 
racial politics of the South, and the decentralized nature of the American government that 
intentionally diffuses power. The dissonance between our inherent distrust of a strong central 
government and our conviction that it nevertheless is responsible for our welfare was very 
apparent here. Also compelling is her argument that race had permeated even the universal need 
for and debate over healthcare.  
It was a good start, but I was wary of a book title as confident as Quadagno’s. I originally 
wanted to look at the fight for Social Security and the struggle for Medicare and Medicaid that 
came nearly three decades later, after the end of a Great Depression and a World War, as a 
comparative study that looked at the different applications of constitutionality at two high points 
of liberal social reform, the 1930s and 1960s. After all, Medicare had Social Security to build 
upon and draw inspiration from. I soon became intrigued though by the documents produced 
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during the nebulous years of the 1940s and 1950s, in which Social Security faced its first 
significant challenges after becoming law and the debate over the need for a national health 
insurance system surfaced. “Social insurance” was rapidly becoming a common term in the 
dialogue. I turned to Paul Starr’s A Social Transformation of American Medicine, a source I 
could not miss, for his take on the ‘origin’ of health insurance, which he identifies as the 
“breakdown of a household economy, as families came to depend on the labor of their chief 
wage earner for income and on the services of doctors and hospitals for medical treatments.” He 
claimed that the “politics of health insurance revolve around four sorts of cost: 1) individual 
losses of income; 2) individual medical costs; 3) the indirect costs of illness to society; and 4) the 
social costs of medical care.” Medical care and health lay at the intersection of positive and 
negative public externalities.  
To further contextualize these costs and cost-saving results of legislation, I started 
looking in two avenues of research that I now think would be better played out separately, in 
essays of their own. At first, I went about trying to look at some of the legal cases that 
established the constitutionality of the Social Security tax (Helvering v. Davis, 1937) and the fact 
that the Justice Department could sue the American Medical Association on antitrust charges 
(American Medical Association v. United States, 1943). I quickly found that the legal intricacies 
of the arguments made analysis difficult for someone with no background in legal history or in 
law. Still, I had some important takeaways from Helvering v. Davis, which confirmed the 
application of the tenth amendment to Social Security. The second avenue involved using 
economic data and insurance enrollment numbers to guage the impact of Medicare on the insured 
population. I hoped to use another database with Yale access called “Historical Statistics of the 
United States” – it listed numbers such as “Persons with hospital and surgical benefits, by type of 
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private health insurance plan from 1939-1992.” At first, I considered incorporating an economic 
history approach but I think the sociopolitical history can best help illuminate any economic 
analysis about impact of this legislation. After all, this legislation cannot have been a shock to a 
market that was only emerging, and the numbers for social security (public insurance) were more 
challenging to find. The descriptive statistics, I concluded, would add just as much to my final 
analysis. 
For some insight into the interaction between the right to health and the government’s 
responsibility for its maintenance on a large scale, I turned to Beatrix Hoffmann’s Healthcare for 
Some, which argues that healthcare’s dual nature as a right and as a commodity contributed to its 
high costs in the United States. She explores various forms of rights and rationing; she takes the 
example of the right of healthcare providers to be reimbursed, which called for more oversight 
from a federal actor that would guarantee these payments in order to reimburse and encourage 
charitable behavior on the part of physicians. Hoffmann also addresses the question of North-
South tension in conversations about healthcare expansion. The 1946 Hill-Burton Act, she points 
out, was the “politically palatable alternative” to national health insurance, setting in place an 
infrastructure that valued expansion and construction of healthcare facilities over expansion of 
access and ability to pay. At the same time, it disproportionately favored Senator Lister Hill’s 
native South by design; it awarded funds to build hospital beds in rural areas to reach an ideal 
hospital bed-person ratio.  
The focus of my project was not to research and ‘expose’ evidence of regional politics 
and bias in the national discussion for health security, but I thought the Hill-Burton Act was 
another fitting example of the balance between federal legislation and states’ power. To extend 
Hoffmann’s argument, rationing was, in a sense, built into this legislation in order to limit health 
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access according to geographic division, race, and the ability to pay. This is another departure 
from what we think of, perhaps, as classical economic thought – in most markets, price is at least 
partly determined by willingness to pay; an agent’s willingness to pay is revealed through the 
market-clearing price. In the world that Hoffmann describes, one’s ability to pay for a health 
service overshadows willingness because of societal and political constraints like race and class.  
The Depression and the Second World War left a legacy of rationing that influenced the 
health insurance debate. My goal was to comb through the many congressional records available 
to examine some of the debates that were happening in the 1940s and 1950s. With the direction 
of Yale librarians, I visited the database Congressional ProQuest for records of extensive 
testimony given by Isidore Falk; in 1947, he was the director of the Bureau of Research and 
Statistics at the Social Security Administration; he was at the Administration from 1941 to 1954. 
He is also a Yale figure: the teenage Isidore Falk first came to Yale as a laboratory assistant, and 
eventually returned as professor of public health. In an exciting “first” for me as a Yale student, I 
visited the Yale Manuscripts and Archives and found many of Isidore Falk’s writings, 
correspondence, and addresses stored there. His correspondence with Edwin Witte, often called 
the “father of Social Security,” was also of particular interest. It was in their writings that I came 
across the many terms that were used in various permutations and combinations to describe the 
still-nebulous concept of health insurance: economic security, health security, and ‘economic 
security against sickness,’ among other terms.  
In reading his statements and addresses, I was struck by the frankness with which Falk 
discusses the term “socialized medicine,” which was to have an increasingly controversial 
connotation in later years. When he used it in 1939 at a national meeting of the National Medical 
Association in New York, he said, “the phrase ‘socialized medicine’ means little or much. It has 
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many different implications for those who use it and to those who hear it. It would be only by 
chance that I could guess what it means to you.” I believe this statement adequately sums up the 
approach with which I myself should approach this essay – I cannot guess what the term meant 
to any given physician, or lawmaker, or patient, but I think it speaks volumes about the 
uncertainty that characterized the era that was facing a lot of simultaneous upheaval: a world war 
was happening, and postwar Keynesian economics along with its emphasis on public spending 
was on the horizon. Edwin Witte’s writings and speeches are organized into a collection called 
Social Security Perspectives. His writings also convey a cautious and wry tone when it comes to 
loading the meaning of “socialized medicine” or any public effort to define the term.  
I thought it fitting to also consider a landmark paper by economist Kenneth Arrow, 
published in 1963 in the American Economic Review: “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics 
of Medical Care.” I do not believe it a coincidence that this important article was published when 
it was, just before the passage of Medicare. Arrow lists taxes and subsidies as the most obvious 
examples of “the redistribution of purchasing power among individuals.” This definition re-
centers the focus of health economics on the interaction between these individuals, and the 
government as well. It is true that the Social Security and Medicare taxes are paid over the 
course of one’s working career in order to redistribute spending on health and life in old age to a 
future consumption period. Arrow also emphasizes what we know today: that the actual medical 
market (that is, the market for medical care) differs from the theoretical competitive market. In 
addition, he points out that where there is uncertainty, information becomes a commodity. This 
language reminded me of when Hoffmann referred to healthcare as a commodity in the 
American mindset. 
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This project would not have been possible without the support of my advisor, Professor 
Jennifer Klein. She took me in as one of her advisees in the summer, giving my latecomer self a 
historian’s perspective on my subject and how to go about tackling it, making my project 
possible. I want to also thank Professor Alan Mikhail for introducing me to Professor Klein over 
the summer. I am also grateful for my fellow seniors under her tutelage; I have learned a lot 
about how we think, and how we ought to think, about American history in the last century in 
our discussions. I would also like to thank the many librarians who helped me hone in on books 
and databases, and discover for myself what sources worked for me: Brent Salter, my Law 
School librarian, and Melanie Maksin and Michelle Hudson of the Center for Science and Social 
Science Information.   
 
